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In monetary models in which agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex-post 
inefficiency in that some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. 
This inefficiency creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept 
nominal deposits and make nominal loans. We show that in general financial intermediation 
improves the allocation and that the gains in welfare arise from paying interest on deposits 
and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. We also demonstrate that increasing 
the rate of inflation can be welfare improving when credit rationing occurs. 
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In monetary models in which agents are subject to trading shocks there is
typically an ex-post ineﬃciency in that some agents are holding idle balances
while others are cash constrained.1 It seems natural to believe that the cre-
ation of a credit market would reduce or eliminate this ineﬃciency. This seems
obvious at ﬁrst glance but it overlooks a fundamental tension between money
and credit. A standard result in monetary theory is that for money to be es-
sential in exchange there must be an absence of record keeping. In contrast, by
deﬁnition, credit requires record keeping. This tension has made it inherently
diﬃcult to introduce credit in a model where money is essential.2 Furthermore,
the existence of credit raises the issues of repayment and enforcement.
This paper constructs a consistent framework in which money and credit
both arise from the same frictions. The objective is to answer the following
questions. First, how can money and credit coexist in a model where money
is essential? Second, does ﬁnancial intermediation improve the allocation?
Third, what is the optimal monetary policy?
To answer these questions we construct a monetary model with ﬁnancial in-
termediation done by perfectly competitive ﬁrms who accept nominal deposits
and make nominal loans. For this process to work we assume that ﬁnancial in-
termediaries have a record-keeping technology that allows them to keep track
of ﬁnancial histories but agents still trade with each other in anonymous goods
markets. Hence, there is no record keeping over good market trades. Conse-
quently, the existence of ﬁnancial record keeping does not eliminate the need
for money as a medium of exchange and so money and credit coexist. We
refer to the ﬁrms that operate this record keeping technology as banks. We do
so because ﬁnancial intermediaries who perform these activities - taking de-
posits, making loans, keeping track of credit histories - are classiﬁed as ‘banks’
by regulators around the world.
In any model with credit default is a serious issue. Therefore, to answer
1Models with this property include Bewley (1980), Levine (1991), Camera and Corbae
(1999), Green and Zhou (2005), and Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2004).
2By essential we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota
(1998) and Wallace (2001)).
2the second and third questions we characterize the monetary equilibria for two
cases: with and without enforcement. By enforcement we mean that banks
can force repayment at no cost, which prevents any default, and the monetary
authority can withdraw money via lump-sum taxes. When no enforcement is
feasible, the only penalty for default is permanent exclusion from the ﬁnancial
system and the central bank cannot use lump-sum taxes. This implies that the
central bank has no more enforcement power than the ﬁnancial intermediaries.
With regard to the second question, we show that credit improves the
allocation. The gain in welfare comes from payment of interest on deposits
and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. With respect to the
third question, the answer depends on whether enforcement is feasible or not.
If it is feasible, the central bank can run the Friedman rule using lump-sum
taxes and this attains the ﬁrst-best allocation. The intuition is that under
the Friedman rule agents can perfectly self-insure against consumption risk
by holding money at no cost. Consequently, there is no need for ﬁnancial
intermediation — the allocation is the same with or without credit. In contrast,
if enforcement is not feasible, the central bank cannot implement the Friedman
rule since deﬂation is not possible. Surprisingly, in this case some inﬂation can
be welfare improving. The reason is that inﬂation makes holding money more
costly, which increases the severity of punishment for default.3
How does our approach diﬀer from the existing literature? Other mecha-
nisms have been proposed to address the ineﬃciencies that arise when some
agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. These mech-
anisms involve either trading cash against some other illiquid asset (Kocher-
lakota 2003), collateralized trade credit (Shi 1996) or inside money (Cavalcanti
and Wallace 1999a,b, Cavalcanti et al. 1999, and He, Huang and Wright, 2003).
In our model debt contracts play a similar role as Kocherlakota’s (2003)
‘illiquid’ bonds — they transfer money at a price from those with low marginal
value of money to those with a high one. In Kocherlakota agents adjust their
portfolios by trading assets and so no liabilities are created. Hence, an agent’s
3This conﬁrms the intuition of Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) for why the optimal
inﬂation rate is positive when enforcement is not feasible.
3ability to acquire money is limited by his asset position. In contrast, debt
contracts allow agents to acquire money even if they have no assets. Here, the
limit on liabilities creation is determined by an agent’s ability to repay. Thus
in general, the presence of additional assets cannot eliminate the role of credit.
This suggests that credit can always improve the allocation regardless of the
number of assets that are available for trading.
The mechanism in Shi (1996) and Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,b) are
related in the sense that the allocation is improved, as in our model, because
agents are able to relax their cash constraint by issuing liabilities. However,
the ineﬃciency created by idle cash balances is not eliminated. In contrast,
in our model agents can either borrow to relax their cash constraints or lend
their idle cash balances to earn interest. Contrary to these other models we
ﬁnd that the welfare gain is not due to relaxing buyers’ cash constraints but
comes from generating positive rates of returns on idle cash balances.4
Af u r t h e rk e yd i ﬀerence of our analysis from the existing literature is that
we have divisible money. Hence, we can study how changes in the growth rate
of the money supply aﬀect the allocation.5 We also have competitive markets
as opposed to bilateral matching and bargaining. Unlike Cavalcanti and Wal-
lace (1999a,b) and related models we do not have bank claims circulating as
medium of exchange and goods market trading histories are unobservable for
all agents. Finally, in contrast to He, Huang and Wright (2003), there is no
security motive for depositing cash in the bank.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and
Section 3 the agents’ decision problems. In Section 4 we derive the equilibrium
when banks can force repayment at no cost and in Section 5 when punishment
for a defaulter is permanent exclusion from the banking system. The last
section concludes.
4This shows that being constrained is not per se a source of ineﬃciency. In general
equilibrium models agents face budget constraints, nevertheless, the equilibrium is eﬃcient
because all gains from trade are exploited.
5Recently, Faig (2004) has also developed a model of banking in which money and goods
are divisible.
42T h e E n v i r o n m e n t
The basic framework we use is the divisible money model developed in Lagos
and Wright (2005). We use the Lagos-Wright framework because it provides a
microfoundation for money demand and it allows us to introduce heterogenous
preferences for consumption and production while still keeping the distribution
of money balances analytical tractable.6 Time is discrete and in each period
there are two perfectly competitive markets that open sequentially.7 There is
a [0,1] continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents and one perishable good produced
and consumed by all agents.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst market agents get a preference shock such
that they can either consume or produce. With probability 1−n an agent can
consume but cannot produce while with probability n the agent can produce
but cannot consume. We refer to consumers as buyers and producers as sellers.
Agents get utility u(q) from q consumption in the ﬁrst market, where u0(q) > 0,
u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +∞,a n du0(∞)=0 . Furthermore, we impose that the
elasticity of utility e(q)=
qu0(q)
u(q) is bounded. Producers incur utility cost c(q)=
q from producing q units of output. To motivate a role for ﬁat money, we
assume that all goods trades are anonymous which means that agents cannot
identify their trading partners. Consequently, trading histories of agents are
private information and sellers require immediate compensation so buyers must
pay with money.8
In the second market all agents consume and produce, getting utility U(x)
from x consumption, with U0(x) > 0, U0(0) = ∞, U0(+∞)=0and U00(x) ≤ 0.
The diﬀerence in preferences over the good sold in the last market allows us
to impose technical conditions such that the distribution of money holdings is
6An alternative framework would be Shi (1997) which we could ammend with preference
and technology shocks to generate the same results.
7Competitive pricing in the Lagos-Wright framework has been introduced by Rocheteau
and Wright (2005) and further investigated in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2005), Lagos
and Rocheteau (2005), and Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2003).
8There is no contradiction between assuming Walrasian markets and anonymity. To
calculate the market clearing price, a Walrasian auctioneer only needs to know the aggregate
excess demand function and not the identity of the individual traders.
5degenerate at the beginning of a period. Agents can produce one unit of the
consumption good with one unit of labor which generates one unit of disutility.
The discount factor across dates is β ∈ (0,1).
We assume a central bank exists that controls the supply of ﬁat currency.
The growth rate of the money stock is given by Mt = γMt−1 where γ>0
and Mt denotes the per capita money stock in t. Agents receive lump sum
transfers τMt−1 =( γ−1)Mt−1 over the period. Some of the transfer is received
at the beginning of market 1 and some during market 2. Let τ1 and τ2 denote
the transfers in market 1 and 2 respectively with (τ1 + τ2)Mt−1 = τMt−1.
Moreover, τ1 =( 1 − n)τb + nτs since the government might wish to treat
buyers and sellers diﬀerently. For notational ease variables corresponding to
the next period are indexed by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous
period are indexed by −1.
If the central bank is able to levy taxes in the form of currency to extract
cash from the economy, then τ<0 and hence γ<1. Implicitly this means
that the central bank can force agents to trade with it involuntarily. However,
this does not mean that it can force agents to produce or consume certain
quantities in the good markets nor does it mean that it knows the identity of
t h ea g e n t s . I ft h ec e n t r a ld o e sn o th a v et h i sp o w e r ,al u m p - s u mt a xi sn o t
feasible and so γ ≥ 1. We will derive the equilibrium for both environments.
Banks and record keeping. We model credit as ﬁnancial intermediation
done by perfectly competitive ﬁrms who accept nominal deposits and make
nominal loans. For this process to work we assume that there is a technology
for record keeping on ﬁnancial histories but not trading histories in the goods
market amongst the agents themselves. We call the ﬁrms that operate this
record keeping technology banks and they can do so at zero cost. We call
them banks because the ﬁnancial intermediaries who perform these activities -
taking deposits, making loans, keeping track of credit histories - are classiﬁed
as ‘banks’ by regulators around the world. Since record keeping can only be
done for ﬁnancial transactions but not good market transactions trade credit
is not feasible. Record keeping does not imply that banks can issue tangible
objects as inside money. Hence, we assume that there are no bank notes in
6circulation. This ensures that outside ﬁat currency is still used as a medium
of exchange in the goods market.9 Finally, we assume that loans and deposits
cannot be rolled over. Consequently, all ﬁnancial contracts are one-period
contracts. We focus one one-period debt contracts because of its simplicity.
If this form of credit improves the allocation, more elaborate contracts should
do this as well. An interesting extension of the model would be to derive the
optimal contract for this environment.
Bank 












Figure 1. Cash and Credit.
Although all goods transactions require money, buyers do not face a stan-
dard cash-in-advance constraint. Before trading they can borrow cash from
the bank to supplement their money holdings but do so at the cost of the nom-
inal interest rate as illustrated in Figure 1 which describes the ﬂow of goods,
credit and money in our model in markets 1 and 2. Note the absence of links
between the seller and the bank. The missing link captures the idea that there
is no record-keeping in the goods market.10
9Alternatively, we could assume that our banks issue their own currencies but there is a
100 percent reserve requirement in place. In this case the ﬁnancial system would be similar
to narrow banking (Wallace 1996).
10For example, it rules out the following mechanism which has been suggested to us. At
the end of each period, every agent reports to the bank the identity of the trading partners
and the quantities of trade. If the report of an agent does not match the report of his
trading partner, then the bank punishes both agents by excluding them from the banking
system. This mechanism requires the agents in the good market can exactly identify their
trading partners which violates our anonymity assumption.
7Default. In any model of credit default is a serious issue. We ﬁrst assume
that banks can force repayment at no cost. In such an environment, default
is not possible so agents face no borrowing constraints. Thgraphics/Figure
1.wmf on how the provision of liquidity via borrowing and lending aﬀects the
allocation. In this case, banks are nothing more than cash machines that
post interest rates for deposits and loans. In equilibrium these posted interest
rates clear the market. We then consider an environment where banks cannot
enforce repayment. The only punishment available is that a borrower who fails
to repay his loan is excluded from the banking sector in all future periods.
Given this punishment, we derive conditions to ensure voluntary repayment
and show that this may involve imposing binding borrowing constraints, i.e.
credit rationing.
3 Symmetric equilibrium
The timing in our model is as follows. At the beginning of the ﬁrst market
agents observe their production and consumption shocks and they receive the
lump-sum transfers τ1. Then, the banking sector opens and agents can borrow
and deposit money. Finally, the banking sector closes and agents trade goods.
I nt h es e c o n dm a r k e ta g e n t st r a d eg o o d sa n ds e t t l eﬁnancial claims.
In period t,l e tφ be the real price of money in the second market. We
study equilibria where end-of-period real money balances are time-invariant
φM = φ−1M−1 = Ω (1)
which implies that
φ−1
φ = γ. We refer to it as a stationary equilibrium.
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let V (m1) denote the expected value
from trading in market 1 with m1 money balances conditional on the aggregate
shock. Let W (m2,l,d) denote the expected value from entering the second
market with m2 units of money, l loans, and d deposits. In what follows, we
look at a representative period t and work backwards from the second to the
ﬁrst market.
83.1 The second market
I nt h es e c o n dm a r k e ta g e n t sp r o d u c eh goods and consume x, repay loans,
redeem deposits and adjust their money balances. If an agent has borrowed l
units of money, then he pays (1 + i)l units of money, where i is the nominal
loan rate. If he has deposited d units of money, he receives (1 + id)d,w h e r e
id is the nominal deposit rate. The representative agent’s program is
W (m2,l,d)= m a x
x,h,m1,+1
[U (x) − h + βV (m1,+1)] (2)
s.t. x + φm1,+1 = h + φ(m2 + τ2M−1)+φ(1 + id)d − φ(1 + i)l
where m1,+1 is the money taken into period t +1and φ is the real price of
money. Rewriting the budget constraint in terms of h and substituting into
(2) yields
W (m2,l,d)=φ[m2 + τ2M−1 − (1 + i)l +( 1+id)d]
+m a x
x,m1,+1
[U (x) − x − φm1,+1 + βV (m1,+1)].
The ﬁrst-order conditions are U0 (x)=1and
φ = βV
0 (m1,+1) (3)
where V 0 (m1,+1) is the marginal value of an additional unit of money taken
into period t +1 .
Notice that the optimal choice of x is the same across time for all agents
and the m1,+1 is independent of m2. The implication is that regardless of how
much money the agent brings into the second market, all agents enter the
following period with the same amount of money. Those who bring too much
money into the second market, spend the excess cash on goods, while those
with too little money produce extra output to sell for money. As a result, the
distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of the following
period.
T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sa r e
Wm=φ (4)
Wl =−φ(1 + i) (5)
Wd =φ(1 + id).( 6 )
9Note that W(m2,l,d) is linear in its arguments.
Finally, to ensure that all loans can be feasibly repaid in market two, let
v be the ratio of aggregate nominal loan repayments, (1 − n)(1+i)l,t ot h e
money stock, M.I fv ≤ 1, then borrowers can repay their loans with one trip to
t h eb a n ko n l ys i n c et h en o m i n a ld e m a n df o rc a s hb yb o r r o w e r sf o rr e p a y m e n t
of loans is less than M.I fv>1, borrowers cannot acquire suﬃcient balances
in the aggregate to repay loans at once. This implies that they repay part of
their loans which is then used to settle deposit claims and the cash reenters the
goods market as depositors use the cash to acquire more goods. This recycling
of cash occurs until all claims are settled.
3.2 The ﬁrst market
Let qb and qs respectively denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and
produced by a seller trading in market 1.L e tp be the nominal price of goods
in market 1. It is straightforward to show that agents who are buyers will
never deposit funds in the bank and sellers will never take out loans. Thus,
ls = db =0 . In what follows we let l denote loans taken out by buyers and d
deposits of sellers. We also drop these arguments in W(m,l,d) where relevant
for notational simplicity.
An agent who has m1 money at the opening of the ﬁrst market has expected
lifetime utility
V (m1)= ( 1− n)[u(qb)+W (m1 + τbM−1 + l − pqb,l)]
+n[−c(qs)+W (m1 + τsM−1 − d + pqs,d)]
(7)
where pqb is the amount of money spent as a buyer, and pqs the money received
as a seller. Once the preference shock occurs, agents become either a buyer or
as e l l e r .
Sellers’ decisions. I fa na g e n ti sas e l l e ri nt h eﬁrst market, his problem is
max
qs,d
[−c(qs)+W (m1 + τsM−1 − d + pqs,d)]
s.t. d ≤ m1 + τsM−1
10The ﬁrst-order conditions are
−c
0 (qs)+pWm=0
−Wm + Wd − λd =0.
where λd is the Lagrangian multiplier on the deposit constraint. Using (4),
the ﬁrst condition reduces to
c
0 (qs)=pφ. (8)
Sellers produce such that the ratio of marginal costs across markets (c0 (qs)/1)
is equal to the relative price (pφ)o fg o o d sa c r o s sm a r k e t s . N o t et h a tqs is
independent of m1 and d. Consequently, sellers produce the same amount
no matter how much money they hold or what ﬁnancial decisions they make.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that for any id > 0 the deposit constraint
is binding and so sellers deposit all their money balances.




[u(qb)+W (m1 + τbM−1 + l − pqb,l)]
s.t. pqb ≤ m1 + τbM−1 + l
l ≤ ¯ l
Notice that buyers cannot spend more cash than what they bring into the ﬁrst
market, m1, plus their borrowing, l,a n dt h et r a n s f e rτbM−1.H ea l s of a c e st h e
constraint that the loan size is constrained by ¯ l. For now we assume that this
constraint is arbitrary. However, it is intended to capture the fact that there
is a threshold ¯ l above which an agent would choose to default.




φi=λ − λl (10)
where λ is the multiplier on the buyer’s cash constraint and λl on the borrowing
constraint. If λ =0 , then (9) reduces to u0 (qb)=c0 (qs) implying trades are
11eﬃcient.11








In this case the buyer borrows up to the point where the marginal beneﬁto f
borrowing equals the marginal cost. He spends all his money and consumes
qb =( m1 + τbM−1 + l)/p. Note that for i>0 trades are ineﬃcient. In eﬀect,
a positive nominal interest rate acts as tax on consumption.




In this case the marginal value of an extra unit of a loan exceeds the mar-
ginal cost. Hence, a borrower would be willing to pay more than the pre-
vailing loan rate. However, if banks are worried about default, then the
interest rate may not rise to clear the market and credit rationing occurs.
Consequently, the buyer borrows ¯ l, spends all of his money and consumes
qb =
¡
m1 + τbM−1 + ¯ l
¢
/p.
S i n c ea l lb u y e r se n t e rt h ep e r i o dw i t ht h es a m ea m o u n to fm o n e ya n df a c e
t h es a m ep r o b l e mqb i st h es a m ef o ra l lo ft h e m . T h es a m ei st r u ef o rt h e









Banks. Banks accept nominal deposits, paying the nominal interest rate id,
and make nominal loans l at nominal rate i. The banking sector is perfectly
competitive, so banks take these rates as given. There is no strategic inter-
action among banks or between banks and agents. In particular, there is no
11With 1 − n buyers and n sellers, the planner maximizes (1 − n)u(qb) − nc(qs) s.t.
(1 − n)qb = nqs. Use the constraint to replace qs in the maximand. The ﬁrst-order condition
for qb is u0 (qb)=c0 (qs).
12bargaining over terms of the loan contract. Finally, we assume that there are
no operating costs or reserve requirements.




s.t. l ≤ ¯ l
u(qb) − (1 + i)lφ ≥ Γ
where Γ is the reservation value of the borrower. The reservation value is the
borrower’s surplus from receiving a loan at another bank. We investigate two
assumptions about the borrowing constraint ¯ l.I n t h e ﬁrst case, banks can
force repayment at no cost. In this case the borrowing constraint is exogenous
and we set it to ¯ l = ∞. In the second case, we assume that a borrower who fails
to repay his loan will be shut out of the banking sector in all future periods.
Given this punishment, the borrowing constraint is endogenous and we need
to derive conditions to ensure voluntary repayment.
The ﬁrst-order condition is






− (1 + i)φ
¸
=0
where λL ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the lending constraint and λΓ
on the participation constraint of the borrower. Proﬁt maximization implies
λΓ > 0.
In any competitive equilibrium the banks make no proﬁts oi = id. Since,
dqb







If repayment is not an issue, λL =0and so the loan oﬀered by the bank
satisﬁes (11). If the constraint on the loan size is binding, i.e. λL > 0,i t
satisﬁes (12).
In a symmetric equilibrium all buyers borrow the same amount, l,a n d
sellers deposit the same amount, d, where proﬁt maximization implies
(1 − n)l = nd. (14)
13Marginal value of money. Using (7) the marginal value of money is
V
0 (m1)=( 1− n)
u0 (qb)
p
+ nφ(1 + id).
In the appendix we show that the value function is concave in m so the solution
to (3) is well deﬁned.







+ n(1 + id)
¸
. (15)
Note that banks increase the marginal value of money because sellers can
deposit idle cash and earn interest. This is is captured by the second term on
the right-hand side. If there are no banks, this term is just n.
4 Equilibrium with enforcement
In this section as a benchmark we assume that the monetary authority can
impose lump-sum taxes and that banks can force repayment of loans at no
cost. Note that this does not imply that the banks or the monetary authority
c a nd i c t a t et h et e r m so ft r a d eb e t w e e np r i v a t ea g e n t si nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t .
In any stationary monetary equilibrium use (3) lagged one period to elim-












The right-hand side measures the value of bringing one extra unit of money
into the ﬁrst market. The ﬁrst term reﬂects net beneﬁt (marginal utility minus
marginal cost) of spending the unit of money on goods when a buyer and the
second term is the value of depositing an extra unit of idle balances when a
seller.
Since banks can force agents to repay their loans, agents are unconstrained
14and so ¯ l = ∞. This implies that (11) holds. Using it in (16) yields12
γ − β
β
=( 1− n)i + nid. (17)
Now, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reﬂects the interest saving from
b o r r o w i n go n el e s su n i to fm o n e yw h e nab u y e r .












¢ − 1. (19)
Deﬁnition 1 When repayment of loans can be enforced, a monetary equilib-
rium with credit is an interest rate i satisfying (18) and a quantity qb satisfying
(19).
Proposition 1 Assume repayment of loans can be enforced. Then if γ ≥ β,a
monetary equilibrium with credit exists and is unique for γ>β .E q u i l i b r i u m
consumption is decreasing in γ,a n ds a t i s ﬁes qb <q ∗ with qb → q∗ as γ → β.
It is clear from (19) that money is neutral, but not super-neutral. In-
creasing its stock has no eﬀect on qb, while changing the growth rate γ does.
Moreover, the Friedman rule generates the ﬁrst-best allocation.
H o wd o e st h i sa l l o c a t i o nd i ﬀer from the allocation in an economy with-
out credit? Let qn
b d e n o t et h eq u a n t i t yc o n s u m e di ns u c ha ne c o n o m y . I ti s
straightforward to show that qn














Comparing (20) to (19), it is clear that qn
b <q b for any γ>β .
12This equation implies that if nominal bonds could be traded in market 2, then their
nominal rate of return ib would be (1 − n)i + nid.F o rµ =0the return would be i = id.
Thus agents would be indiﬀerent between holding a nominal bond or holding a bank deposit.
15Corollary 1 When γ>β , ﬁnancial intermediation improves the allocation
and welfare.
The key result of this section is that ﬁnancial intermediation improves the
allocation away from the Friedman rule. The greatest impact on welfare is for
moderate values of inﬂation. The reason is that near the Friedman rule there is
little gain from redistributing idle cash balances while for high inﬂation rates
money is of little value anyway. At the Friedman rule agents can perfectly
self-insure against consumption risk because the cost of holding money is zero.
Consequently, there is no welfare gain from ﬁnancial intermediation.
Given that banks improve the allocation away from the Friedman rule, is
it because they relax borrowers’ liquidity constraints or because they allow
payment of interest to depositors? The following Proposition answers this
question.
Proposition 2 T h eg a i ni nw e l f a r ef r o mﬁnancial intermediation is due to
the fact that it allows payment of interest to depositors and not from relaxing
borrowers’ liquidity constraints
According to Proposition 2 the gain in welfare comes from payment of in-
terest to agents holding idle balances. To prove this claim we show in the proof
of Proposition 2 that in equilibrium, agents are indiﬀerent between borrowing
to ﬁnance equilibrium consumption or holding the amount of cash that allows
them to acquire the same amount without borrowing. The only importance
of borrowing is to sustain payment of interest to depositors. That is, even
though each individual agent is indiﬀerent between borrowing and not bor-
rowing, agents taking out loans are needed to ﬁnance the interest received by
the depositors.
As a ﬁnal proof of this argument, we consider a systematic government pol-
icy that redistributes cash in market 1 by imposing lump-sum taxes on sellers
and giving the cash as lump-sum transfers to buyers. This clearly relaxes
the liquidity constraints of the buyers while paying no interest to depositors.
However, inspection of (20) reveals that neither τ1 nor τb appear in this equa-
tion. Hence, varying the transfer across the two markets or by redistributing
16cash from sellers to buyers in a lump-sum fashion has no eﬀect on qn
b .I t
only aﬀects the equilibrium price of money in the last market. Agents simply
change the amount of money they bring into market 1 and so the demand for
money changes in market 2 which alters the price of money. Note also that
this implies that the allocation with credit cannot be replicated by government
policies using lump-sum transfers or taxes.
Finally, we have assumed Walrasian prices in market 1 but one can also as-
sume bilateral matching and bargaining. In an early working paper (Berentsen
et al. (2004)) we show that the results are qualitatively the same - ﬁnancial
intermediation improves the allocation and the Friedman rule is the best mone-
tary policy. Thus the existence of a credit market increases output and welfare
regardless of the pricing mechanism.13
5 Equilibrium without enforcement
In the previous section enforcement occurred in two occasions. First, the
monetary authority could impose lump-sum taxes. Second, banks could force
repayment of loans. Here, we assume away any enforcement so that all trade
is voluntary.
The implications are that the monetary authority cannot run a deﬂation.
Consequently, γ ≥ 1. Second, since production is costly, those who borrow in
market 1 have an incentive to default in market 2. To oﬀset this short-run
beneﬁt we assume that if an agent defaults on his loan then the only punish-
ment is permanent exclusion from the banking system. This is consistent with
the requirement that all trades are voluntary since banks can refuse to trade
with private agents. Furthermore, it is in the banks best interest to share
information about agents’ repayment histories.
For credit to exist, it must be the case that borrowers prefer repaying
loans to being banished from the banking system. Given this punishment,
the borrowing constraint ¯ l is endogenous and we need to derive conditions to
13A similar result is found by Faig and Huangfu (2004) in a model of competitive search
in which market-makers can charge diﬀerential entry fees for buyers and sellers.
17ensure voluntary repayment. In what follows, since the transfers only aﬀect
prices, we set τb = τs = τ1.
For buyers entering the second market with no money and who repay their
loans, the expected discounted utility in a steady state is
U = U (x
∗) − hb + βV (m1,+1 )
where hb is a buyer’s production in the second market if he repays his loan.
Consider the case of a buyer who reneges on his loan. The beneﬁto f
reneging is that he has more leisure in the second market because he does not
work to repay the loan. The cost is that he is out of the banking system,
meaning that he cannot borrow or deposit funds for the rest of his life. He
cannot lend because the bank would conﬁscate his deposits to settle his loan
arrears. Thus, a deviating buyer’s expected discounted utility is
b U = U (b x) −b hb + βb V (ˆ m1,+1 )
where the hat indicates the optimal choice by a deviator. The value of being
in the banking system U as well as the expected discounted utility of defection
b U depend on the growth rate of the money supply γ. This puts constraints
on γ that the monetary authority can impose without destroying ﬁnancial
intermediation.
Existence of a monetary equilibrium with credit requires that U ≥ b U,w h e r e
the borrowing constraint ¯ l satisﬁes
U = b U. (21)
In the proof of Proposition 3 we show that ¯ l satisﬁes
¯ l =
β
φ(1 + i)(1− β)
½






[b qb − (1 − n)qb]
¾
(22)
where Ψ = u(qb)−u(b qb)−c0 (qs)(qb − b qb) ≥ 0. In an unconstrained equilibrium
with credit we have l ≤ ¯ l and in a constrained equilibrium l = ¯ l.
In order to determine the sign of ¯ l, we need to determine whether a devi-
ator carries more money than a non-deviator since in (22) b qb − (1 − n)qb =
18(ˆ m1 − m1)/p. This in turn depends on his degree of risk aversion. It is reason-
able to assume that the deviator is suﬃciently risk averse that he holds more
real balances to compensate for the loss of consumption insurance provided
by the banking system. In the appendix we show that a suﬃcient condition
for this to be true is that the degree of relative risk aversion is greater than
one. If this condition holds, then b qb − (1 − n)qb > 0 for any γ ≥ 1 so ¯ l is
non-negative.
In any equilibrium, proﬁt maximization implies that banks lend out all of






To guarantee repayment in a constrained equilibrium banks charge a nominal
loan rate, ¯ ı, that is below the market clearing rate.14
Deﬁnition 2 A monetary equilibrium with unconstrained credit is a triple






















such that 0 <φ l= nc0 (qs)qb <φ ¯ l,w h e r eqs = 1−n
n qb.
Deﬁnition 3 A monetary equilibrium with constrained credit is a triple (¯ qb, b qb,¯ ı)
satisfying (23), (24) and (22) where nc0 (¯ qs)¯ qb = φ¯ l and ¯ qs = 1−n
n ¯ qb.
14This may seem counter-intuitive since one would think that banks would reduce ¯ l to
induce repayment. However, this cannot be an equilibrium since it would imply that banks
are not lending out all of their deposits. If banks are not lending out all of their deposits
then zero proﬁts would require id =( 1− µ)i where µ is the fraction of deposits held idle by
the bank. If all banks were to choose a triple (i,id,µ) with µ>0 such that they earned zero
proﬁts, then a bank could capture the entire market and become a monopolist by raising id
by an inﬁnitesimal amount and lowering µ and i by an inﬁnitesimal amount. Since all banks
can do this, in a constrained equilibrium, the only feasible solution is µ =0and i = id =¯ ı.
19Proposition 3 Let the degree of risk aversion be greater than one. Then
there exists a critical value ˜ β such that if β ≥ ˜ β there is a e γ>1 such that the
following is true:
(i) If γ>e γ, a unique monetary equilibrium with unconstrained credit exists.
(ii) If 1 <γ≤ e γ, a monetary equilibrium with constrained credit may exist.
(iii) If γ =1 , no monetary equilibrium with credit exists.
According to Proposition 3, existence of a monetary equilibrium with credit
requires that there is some inﬂation. The reason for this is quite intuitive. If a
borrower works to repay his loan in market 2, he is strictly worse oﬀ than when
he defaults since the outside option (trading with money only) yields almost
the eﬃcient consumption q∗ in all future periods. With zero inﬂation, agents
are able to self-insure at low cost, thus having access to ﬁnancial markets is of
little value. As a result, borrowers will not repay their loans and so ﬁnancial
intermediation is impossible. This result is related to Aiyagari and Williamson
(2000) who also report a break-down of ﬁnancial intermediation in a dynamic
contracting model with private information close to the Friedman rule.
For small rates of inﬂation credit rationing occurs. Again, for low rates of
inﬂation the cost of using money to self-insure is low. To induce repayment
banks charge a below market-clearing interest rate since this reduces the total
repayment the borrowers have to make. In short, with an endogenous bor-
rowing constraint, the interest rate is lower than would occur in an economy
where banks can force repayment.15
One aspect that is puzzling about this result is that the incentive to de-
fault is higher for low nominal interest rates and lower for high nominal in-
terest rates. This seems counter-intuitive at ﬁrst glance since standard credit-
rationing models, such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), suggest that the likelihood
of default increases as interest rates rise. The reason for the diﬀerence in results
is that standard credit rationing models focus on real interest rates, while our
model is concerned with nominal interest rates. In our model, nominal rates
rise because of perfectly anticipated inﬂation, which acts as a tax on deviators’
15This result is similar to results reported in Kehoe and Levine (1993), Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) or Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2004).
20wealth since they carry more money for transactions purposes. This reduces
the incentive to default thereby alleviating the need to ration credit. Conse-
quently, a key contribution of our analysis is to show how credit rationing can
arise from changes in nominal interest rates.
Corollary 2 If a monetary equilibrium with constrained credit exists, con-
sumption and welfare can be increasing in the growth rate of the money supply
γ.
When banks have to worry about default, we obtain an interesting welfare
result. For γ>e γ the monetary equilibrium with unconstrained credit dis-
plays the standard property that consumption and welfare are decreasing in
γ. In contrast, consumption and welfare are increasing in γ for the constrained
equilibrium. The reason is that at low rates of inﬂa t i o na ni n c r e a s eo ft h ei n -
ﬂation rate reduces the incentive to default. This reduces credit rationing and
therefore allows the credit market to perform more eﬃciently.










Figure 2: Welfare with endogenous borrowing constraint.
Figure 2 is a numerical example of our economy in which the constrained
credit equilibrium exists and is unique. As before, the existence of credit leads
to higher welfare than a regime without credit, as displayed by the dotted
21blue line, even when credit is rationed. It also illustrates that with credit
welfare rises with inﬂation for the constrained equilibrium while it falls in the
unconstrained equilibrium.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have shown how money and credit can coexist in an essential
model of money. Our main ﬁndings is that ﬁnancial intermediation in general
improves the allocation. If enforcement exists, the optimal monetary policy is
the Friedman rule and it generates the ﬁrst-best allocation. If not, then the
optimal policy may require a positive rate of inﬂation.
Our framework is open to many extensions such as private bank note issue,
ﬁnancing of investment instead of consumption, and other ﬁnancial contracts.
We could also extend the model to investigate the role of banks in transmitting
other type of shocks such as productivity shocks or preference shocks. Finally,
the interaction of government regulation and stabilization policies would allow
analysis of diﬀerent monetary arrangementIKT24P00.wmfpressed by the real-
bill doctrine or the quantity theory as studied in Sargent and Wallace (1982).
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25Appendix
Proof that V (m1) is concave ∀m. Diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to m1






























Recall from (4), (5), and (6) that Wm = φ, Wl = −φ(1 + i) and Wd =
φ(1 + id) ∀m2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
∂qs
∂m1 =0because the quantity a seller produces
is independent of his money holdings. We also know that ∂d
∂m1 =1since a
seller deposits all his cash when i>0. Hence,















Since i>0 implies pqb = m1+τbM−1+l we have 1−p
∂qb
∂m1 + ∂l
∂m1 =0 . Hence16
V
0 (m1)=( 1− n)
u0 (qb)
p
+ nφ(1 + id)
In a symmetric equilibrium qs = 1−n
n qb.D e ﬁne m∗ = pq∗.T h e ni fm1 <m ∗,
0 <q b <q ∗, implying
∂qb
∂m1 > 0 so that V 00 (m1) < 0.I f m1 ≥ m∗, qb = q∗
implying
∂qb
∂m1 =0 ,s ot h a tV 00 (m1)=0 .T h u s ,V (m1) is concave ∀m.
Proof of Proposition 1. Because u(q) is strictly concave there is a unique








, q → q∗,a n df r o m
(18) i → 0. In this equilibrium, the Friedman rule sustains eﬃcient trades in
the ﬁrst market. Since V (m1) is concave, then for γ>β ,t h ec h o i c em1 is
maximal.
We now derive equilibrium consumption and production in the second mar-
ket. Recall that, due to idiosyncratic trade shocks and ﬁnancial transactions,
money holdings are heterogeneous after the ﬁrst market closes. Therefore, if
we set m1 = M−1, the money holdings of agents at the opening of the second
market are m2 =0for buyers and m2 = 1
n (1 + τ1)M−1 for sellers.
16Note that u0 (qb)
∂qb
∂m1 − φ(1 + i) ∂l
∂m1 = u0 (qb)
∂qb








∂m1 (u0 (qb) − φ(1 + i)p)+φ(1 + i)=φ(1 + i)=
u0(qb)
p .
26Equation (3) gives us x∗ = U0−1 (1). The buyer’s production in the second
market can be derived as follows
hb = x
∗ + φ{m1,+1 +( 1+i)l − τ2M−1} = x
∗ + c
0 (qs)qb + φil
since in equilibrium
m1,+1 = M = M−1 + τ1M−1 + τ2M−1 and c
0 (qs)qb = φ[(1 + τ1)M−1 + l].
Thus, an agent who was a buyer in market 1 has to work to recover the
production cost of his consumption and the interest on his loan. The seller’s
production is
hs =x
∗ + φ{m1,+1 − [pqs +( 1+τ1)M−1 + idd + τ2M−1]}
=x
∗ − c
0 (qs)qs − φidd
The expected hours worked h satisﬁes
h =( 1− n)hb + nhs = x
∗ (26)
since in equilibrium qb = n
1−nqs and i(1 − n)l = idnd. Finally, hours in market
2 can be also expressed in terms of q as in the following table
Trading history: Production in the last market:
Buy hb = x∗ + c0 (qs)(1− n)qb + ne(qb)u(qb)
Sell hs = x∗ −
(1−n)
n [c0 (qs)(1− n)qb + ne(qb)u(qb)]
Since we assumed that the elasticity of utility e(qb) is bounded, we can
scale U(x) such that there is a value x∗ = U0−1 (1) greater than the last term
for all qb ∈ [0,q ∗]. Hence, hs is positive for for all qb ∈ [0,q∗] ensuring that the
equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that at some point in time t an agent
at the beginning of market 2 chooses never to borrow again but continues to
deposit. The ﬁrst thing to note is that it is optimal for him to buy the same
quantity qb since his optimal choice still satisﬁes (19). This implies that his
money balances are ¯ m1,+1 = m1,+1 + l+1. An agent who decides to opt out
from borrowing has to carry more money but he saves the interest on loans
in the future. In particular, consumption and production in the market 1 are
27not aﬀected. The diﬀerence in lifetime payoﬀsc o m ef r o md i ﬀerence in hours
worked.
If he enters market 2 having been a buyer, the hours worked are
¯ hb=x
∗ + φ{m1,+1 + l+1 +( 1+i)l − τ2M−1}
=x
∗ + c
0 (qs)qb + φl+1 + φil
while if he sold in market 1 he works
¯ hs =x
∗ + φ{m1,+1 + l+1 − [pqs +( 1+i)d + τ2M−1]}
=x
∗ − c
0 (qs)qs + φl+1 − φidd
The expected hours worked satisfy
¯ h =( 1− n)¯ hb + n¯ hs = x
∗ + φl+1
Consequently, from (26) the additional hours worked are
¯ h − h = φl+1 = γnc
0 (qs)qb > 0 (27)
since l+1 = γl in a steady state.
L e tu sn e x tc o n s i d e rt h eh o u r sw o r k e di nm a r k e t2i ns o m ef u t u r ep e r i o d .
Since he has no loan to repay the hours worked are
˘ hb =x
∗ + φ{m1,+1 + l+1 − τ2M−1}
=x
∗ + φ{M−1 + τ1M−1 + l + l+1 − l}
=x
∗ + c
0 (qs)qb + φl(γ − 1)
=x
∗ + c
0 (qs)qb + nc
0 (qs)qb (γ − 1)




m1,+1 + l+1 −
£





M−1 + τ1M−1 + l + l+1 − l −
£




0 (qs)qb + φl(γ − 1) − φ
£




0 (qs)qb + φl(γ − 1) − c
0 (qs)qs − φ(1 + i)pqb
=x
∗ + nc
0 (qs)qb (γ − 1) − c




0 (qs)qb (γ − 1) − c
0 (qs)qs − (γ − β)c
0 (qs)qb/β
28The expected hours worked h satisﬁes
˘ h =( 1− n)˘ hb + n˘ hs = x
∗ − nc
0 (qs)qbγ (1 − β)/β
The expected gain from this strategy in any future period is
˘ h − h = −nc
0 (qs)qbγ (1 − β)/β < 0 (28)
Then, from (27) and (28), the total expected gain from this deviation is
¯ h − h +
β
³




So agents are indiﬀerent to borrow at the current rate of interest or taking in
the equivalent amount of money themselves.
Proof of Corollary ??. Neither τ1 nor τb appear in (19). Therefore, (τ1,τ2)
can only aﬀect the equilibrium φ. Of course, by changing τ1 we change τ2, for
a given rate of growth of money. To see how the transfers aﬀect φ note that
φl = c0(qs)nqb.S i n c el = n
1−nM−1(1 + τs)= n
1−nM(1+τs










which implies the price of money in the second market, φ,i sa ﬀected by the
timing and size of lump-sum transfers.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Since the transfers do not aﬀect quantities set
τb = τs = τ1. We now derive the endogenous borrowing constraint ¯ l.T h i s
quantity is the maximal loan that a borrower is willing to repay in the second
market at given market prices. For buyers entering the second market with
no money, who repay their loans, the expected discounted utility in a steady
state is
U = U (x
∗) − hb + βV (m1,+1 )
where hb is a buyer’s production in the second market if he repays his loan.
A deviating buyer’s expected discounted utility is
b U = U (b x) −b hb + βb V (ˆ m1,+1 )
where the hat indicates the optimal choice by a deviator.
29We now derive b x, b hb, b qb,a n db qs. In the last market the deviating buyer’s
program is
c W (ˆ m2)= max
e x,e h, ˆ m1,+1
h
U (b x) −b hb + βb V (ˆ m1,+1)
i
s.t. b x + φˆ m1,+1 = b hb + φ(ˆ m2 + τ2M−1)
As before, the ﬁrst-order conditions are U0 (b x)=1and
−φ + βb V
0 (ˆ m1,+1)=0 . (29)
Thus, b x = x∗.T h eﬁrst-order condition if the deviator is a seller in the ﬁrst
market is −c0 (b qs)+pφ =0 . Hence, the deviator produces the same amount
as non-deviating sellers so b qs = qs = 1−n
n qb.


















Now if we compare (30) with (19) we ﬁnd that
1 − n =
u0 (qb) − c0 (qs)
u0 (b qb) − c0 (qs)
(31)
implying b qb <q b.
The money holdings of the deviator grows at rate γ since from (30) b qb is
constant across time. The money holdings of the deviator at the opening of
t h es e c o n dm a r k e ta r eˆ m2 =0having bought and ˆ m2 =ˆ m1 + τ1M−1 + pqs
having sold. Thus, hours worked are
b hb =x
∗ + φ[ˆ m1,+1 − τ2M−1]=x
∗ + c
0 (qs) b qb + φ(γ − 1)(ˆ m1 − M−1) (32)
b hs =x
∗ + φ[ˆ m1,+1 − (ˆ m1 + τ1M−1) − pb qs − τ2M−1]
=x
∗ − c
0 (qs)qs + φ(γ − 1)(ˆ m1 − M−1) (33)
since for a deviator pb qb =ˆ m1+τ1M−1. The term φ(γ − 1)(ˆ m1 − M−1) reﬂects
t h ef a c tt h a tt h ed e v i a t o ri ss u b j e c tt ot h ei n ﬂation tax in a diﬀerent way than
the representative agent.
30Since pqb = 1
1−n (1 + τ1)M−1 in equilibrium and pb qb =ˆ m1 + τ1M−1 it
follows that φ(γ − 1)(ˆ m1 − M−1)=c0 (qs)(γ − 1)[b qb − (1 − n)qb]. Hence, the
expected hours worked for a deviator are
b h = x
∗ + c
0 (qs){(1 − n)(b qb − qb)+( γ − 1)[b qb − (1 − n)qb]} (34)
The endogenous borrowing constraint ¯ l satisﬁes U
¡¯ l
¢
= b U.T o d e r i v e ¯ l













= b U we have
U (x
∗) − hb + βV (m1,+1 )=U (b x) −b hb + βb V (ˆ m1,+1 )
where b hb satisﬁes (32). Since b x = x∗ we have
b hb − hb = β
h
b V (ˆ m1,+1 ) − V (m1,+1 )
i
so
φ(1 + i)¯ l = γc
0 (qs)[b qb − (1 − n)qb]+β
h
V (m1,+1 ) − b V (ˆ m1,+1 )
i
(35)
since φl = nc0 (qs)qb.
Finally, the continuation payoﬀsa r e













t [(1 − n)u(qb) − nc(qs)+U (x
∗) − h].
In a steady state the diﬀerence is
V (m1,+1 ) − b V (ˆ m1,+1 )=
n




={(1 − n)Ψ + c
0 (qs)(γ − 1)[b qb − (1 − n)qb]}(1 − β)
−1 .
where Ψ = u(qb) − u(b qb) − c0 (qs)(qb − b qb).S i n c e
u(qb) − u(b qb)




31for all γ>β , it follows that Ψ > 0. Consequently, (35) can be written as
¯ l =
β
φ(1 + i)(1− β)
½






[b qb − (1 − n)qb]
¾
.
Unconstrained credit equilibrium. In an unconstrained equilibrium
we have unique values of qb and i. All that is left is to show is that l ≤ ¯ l,o r










[b qb − (1 − n)qb]
¾
Since in an unconstrained equilibrium (11) and (20) hold, we need
nqbu
0 (qb)(1− β) ≤ β (1 − n){Ψ +[ u
0 (b qb) − c
0 (qs)][b qb − (1 − n)qb]} (36)
We need to determine the sign of b qb − (1 − n)qb. Using (31) we obtain
b qb − (1 − n)qb =
b qbu0 (b qb) − qbu0 (qb)
u0 (b qb) − c0 (qs)
+
c0 (qs)(qb − b qb)
u0 (b qb) − c0 (qs)
Since qb ≥ b qb for all γ,asuﬃcient condition for b qb − (1 − n)qb ≥ 0 is that
qu0 (q) is monotonically decreasing in q.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oh a v i n gR(q)=





f (γ)≡β (1 − n){Ψ +[ u
0 (b qb) − c
0 (qs)][b qb − (1 − n)qb]}
Then, g(β)=nq∗ (1 − β) > 0 and f (β)=0 . Thus, the repayment constraint
is violated at the Friedman rule.
It can be shown that
f
0 (γ)=c
0 (qs)[b qb − (1 − n)qb] −
c00(qs)c0 (qs)
2 (1 − n)
2 nqb
[nu00 (qb)c0 (qs) − u0 (qb)c00 (qs)(1− n)]
> 0
g





Since g(β) >f(β),as u ﬃcient condition for uniqueness, should an equilibrium







β (1 − n)u
00 (ˆ qb)[b qb − (1 − n)qb]
db qb
dγ










u00 (qb) − c00 (qs)(1− n)



























The left hand side is negative. The second term on the RHS is positive. The
ﬁrst term will be non-negative for β close to one. Thus, for β suﬃciently close
to one, if an equilibrium exists it is unique.
To establish existence, note that as β → 1, g(β) → f (β).S i n c ef0 (γ) >





exists for all γ greater than a ﬁnite value ˜ γ and it is unique.
Constrained credit equilibrium We now consider 1 ≤ γ<˜ γ.I nac o n -
strained equilibrium the defection constraint must hold with equality implying
(1 +¯ ı)nc










[b qb − (1 − n)¯ qb]
¾
(37)
where ¯ qb denotes the quantity consumed and ¯ ı i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei nac o n -




















where ¯ qs = 1−n
n ¯ qb. Thus, a constrained equilibrium is a list {¯ qb, b qb,¯ ı} such that
(37)-(39) hold.
We now investigate the properties of (37)-(39). At ¯ ı =0 ,f r o m( 3 8 )a n d
(39), ¯ qb = b qb.T h e n f r o m ( 3 7 ) w e h a v e γ =1 . This implies there is one and
only one monetary policy consistent with a nominal interest rate of zero in
33a constrained credit equilibrium. Taking the total derivative of (37)-(39) and




These observations imply that for all γ ∈ (1,e γ] we have ¯ ı>0.I t t h e n
follows that a constrained credit equilibrium can exist if and only if γ ∈ (1,e γ].
However, we cannot show existence of a constrained equilibrium in general.
Finally, we show that consumption can be increasing in γ in the constrained
equilibrium. Taking the total derivative of (37)-(39) and evaluating it at γ =1




if β ≥ 2−n
2−n2 which is satisﬁed for a wide range of n when β is close to one. Thus,
in the constrained equilibrium if agents are suﬃciently patient, consumption
can be increasing in γ.
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